M&A GAINS TO ACQUIRERS AND ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS Evidence from Japan by Zhu Weifeng
<MSc in Finance Degree Thesis> 
AY 2018 
 
 M&A GAINS TO ACQUIRERS AND ROLE OF FINANCIAL 
ADVISORS  
Evidence from Japan 
 
57161507-0  ZHU WEIFENG 
SEMINAR ON EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 
PROF. SUZUKI KAZUNORI  
D.E. PROF. ARIKAWA YASUHIRO   D.E. PROF. KAWAMOTO YUKO 
 
Summary 
 
This dissertation looks into the roles of Japanese commercial banking groups and “kanji” 
(arranger) securities houses as M&A advisors in the Japanese market. Commercial banks or securities 
houses could gain private information about clients through commercial banking or underwriting 
activities and therefore be able to advise M&A deals that suit the clients better, which is referred to as a 
certification effect. In addition, advisors from a Japanese commercial banking group could also take 
extra care when advising M&A due to a “main yose” phenomenon where Japanese main banks are 
implicitly assumed to provide life support for borrowers in distress. If a deal is carefully advised and 
suits an acquirer, it should be rewarded by the market in the form of positive abnormal returns. However, 
potential conflicts of interest between advisors and acquirers may mitigate or diminish these effects. 
To examine the effects brought by commercial banking and “kanji” securities relationships 
between acquirers and financial advisors, I conduct an event study for 600 M&A deals carried out by 
Japanese public firms announced between 2012 and 2017. I find acquirers on average experience a 
significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns of 0.95%. In addition, I find targets hiring acquirers’ 
“kanji” securities houses as M&A advisors to be associated with lower acquirer abnormal returns. This 
result is moderately significant at the 10% level and shows that Japanese “kanji” securities houses and 
their clients as acquirers suffer from conflicts of interest when advising M&A. However, I fail to find 
similar evidence of conflicts of interest for commercial banking groups. I also do not find evidence in 
support of a net certification effect: “kanji” securities houses and commercial banks who have long-term 
relationships with acquirers and supposedly know some private information about them do not advise 
better deals.  
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Section 1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation investigates the roles of commercial banking groups and “kanji” (arranger) 
securities houses as M&A advisors in the Japanese market. Generally speaking, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) are characterized by information asymmetry between acquiring firms and target firms. In an 
M&A deal, information asymmetry can often lead to uncertainty in both valuation process and deal 
execution. To mitigate such problems, financial advisors are often hired by both acquirers and targets. 
Financial advisors specialize in gathering and processing information. This strength in information 
gathering and production allows financial advisors to provide valuable advice to both acquirers and 
targets on the proper transaction prices and the potential synergies, along with the associated risks. In 
addition, financial advisors also often help both parties negotiate with their counterparties and are 
therefore able to affect deal outcome. 
There are different types of financial advisors in the global M&A market. First, investment 
banks or securities houses, which include firms like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Nomura, have 
long enjoyed a large share of the market. In addition to corporate finance advisory services that include 
M&A and securities offerings, investment banks also typically provide other financial services ranging 
from trading to asset management. In a Japanese context, a securities house is called “kanji” (arranger) 
for a public firm if it participated in this firm’s IPO. Such “kanji” securities houses often continue to 
offer other services to the firms after IPO. Second, boutique shops, including firms like Lazard, 
Rothschild & Co, and GCA Savvian, have been playing an increasingly important role in the global 
M&A market. Boutique financial advisors focus on transactions of particular types or in particular 
industries. Another important type of advisor actively involved in M&A deals is consulting firms who 
offer a variety of professional services. There are numerous consulting shops in the world. Among them 
some are strategic consulting firms like McKinsey & Co and the Boston Consulting Group, some are 
accounting affiliated consulting shops like Deloitte, KPMG, PwC, and Ernst & Young. M&A deals can 
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naturally appear in strategic or business solution reports which are created by consulting shops as a 
quick answer to their clients’ problems. Besides, a due diligence process is often required in an M&A 
deal, therefore consulting firms specializing in accounting, tax, and valuation services are also frequently 
hired. Last but not least, commercial banks and their affiliated entities also play a significant role in the 
M&A market. Although not one focused on M&A, a banking study done by Chan, Greenbaum, and 
Thakor (1986) suggests that private information about a firm gathered and accumulated by a commercial 
bank during a commercial lending relationship can be reused and transferred. This could potentially 
allow commercial banks to have an informational advantage over other types of advisors when advising 
clients with whom they have a prior lending relationship.  
When it comes to studying commercial banks as financial advisors, the Japanese M&A market 
is an especially interesting one for three reasons. First, as the third largest economy in the world, Japan 
has a large and highly active M&A market. According to a Japanese M&A Review by Thomson Reuters, 
there were 2,434 M&A deals completed in 2017 with a total deal value of JPY 14.53 trillion, or roughly 
$145 billion. This huge Japanese M&A market we see today owes its very existence to the Japanese 
government’s deregulation of the market for corporate control in the 1990s which was, according to 
Hanamura, Inoue, and Suzuki (2008), intended to “promote the consolidation among Japanese 
companies and help the economy to recover from the prolonged recession”.  
Second, commercial banks and their affiliated entities have a very strong presence in Japan and 
are involved not only in lending, but also in M&A advisory. The three so-called “megabank groups”, 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (MUFG), Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) and Mizuho 
Financial Group each provides banking and advisory services to a wide range of Japanese firms.  For 
example, according to the official website of Mizuho Financial Group, it covers around 70% of all 
public companies in Japan. According to each bank’s 2017 official filings, Mizuho Financial Group has 
a total assets of JPY 200 trillion, while MUFG has a total assets of JPY 303 trillion and SMBC 198 
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trillion. Though the MUFG and SMBC have not disclosed their exact number of company coverage, it is 
not difficult to say that these three megabanks all have banking relationships with a great deal of 
Japanese corporate clients.  
Third, Japanese commercial banks often work closely with their affiliated securities houses. 
According to Cargill and Todd (1993), the introduction of the Financial System Reform Law enacted by 
the Japanese Diet in 1993 allows commercial banks and securities houses to enter the market of each 
other through the use of subsidiaries. Since then, Japanese financial firms have been expanding the use 
of the so called “ginsho renkei” model which literally means “the collaboration between banks and 
securities houses”. In fact, all three megabanks discussed above have their own securities houses: 
MUFG has Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities, SMBC has SMBC Nikko Securities, and Mizuho 
Financial Group has Mizuho Securities. Smaller banks, too, have similar entities within their groups. 
What’s more, bankers working in Japanese commercial banking groups often have two business cards: 
one of the bank and one of the affiliated securities house. Although there does exist a “Chinese wall” 
between commercial lending departments and M&A departments within a banking group, this kind of 
close relationship between commercial banking and investment banking potentially allows private 
information generated and held by a Japanese commercial bank to be, to a degree, transferred to and 
reused by its advisory department or affiliated securities house. In addition, this transfer also works in 
the other direction: private information gathered by an affiliated securities house during a securities 
underwriting or corporate advisory process can potentially be used by its group bank. Last but not least, 
a Japanese “kanji” securities house who arranged IPO and provides a series of services for an acquirer 
could also potentially have private information about the acquirer. 
Previous researchers have conflicting ideas regarding the involvement of commercial banks in 
M&A. First of all, there are the certification effects of commercial banks. Commercial banks’ ability to 
mobilize and reuse private information obtained during lending in supplying services such M&A 
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advisory are higher than other advisors and should be able to provide better services. The intuition is that 
commercial banks tend to have a longer relationship, continuously monitor their clients and should thus 
have a better idea about what targets suit their clients. With a strong market dominance, abundant 
information obtained through continuous monitoring, and close collaboration within groups, Japanese 
commercial banking groups can be expected to have high certification effects. Similarly, Japanese “kanji” 
securities houses could also potentially obtain private information about their clients through securities 
underwriting and corporate advisory activities and bring certification effects. Besides, as is documented 
by Ohashi and Singh (2004), there is a “main yose” phenomenon in Japan: main banks functioning as 
the life-saver for borrowing firms in financial distress. The main banks implicitly have to buy loans from 
nonmain banks at book value when a borrower’ financial position goes wrong. This could cause 
Japanese main banks and main-bank-affiliated advisors to be more careful when advising M&A deals 
for clients to whom they lend money. Last but not least, commercial banking groups as well as securities 
houses, can be faced with complicated conflicts of interest when providing different services including 
lending, underwriting and M&A advisory, which can bring negative impacts on the deals they advise.  
Motivated by these conflicting ideas, in this paper, I study the short-term wealth effects on 
Japanese acquirers and empirically examine the effects brought by commercial banking groups and 
“kanji” (arranger) securities houses as advisors in the Japanese M&A market. Along with a set of control 
variables, I construct four dummy variables which indicate the commercial banking and securities 
underwriting relationship between acquirers and advisors on both the buying side and target side. Then, I 
run several regressions to see the effects brought by each dummy variable. 
Out of my sample of 600 M&A deals carried out by Japanese public companies over the period 
from January 2012 to December 2017, there are 210 deals where acquirers hired their own “kanji” 
securities houses as advisors, 153 deals where acquirers hired their own commercial bank groups as 
advisors, 96 deals where targets hired acquirers’ “kanji” securities houses as advisors, and 111 deals 
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where targets hired acquirers’ commercial banking groups as advisors. In contrast to many U.S. results 
and the Japanese results by Fatemi, Fooladi, and Garehkoolchian (2017), using this sample, I find an 
average acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 0.95% that is significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. 
Having confirmed that multicollinearity is not an issue after checking the correlation matrix and 
variance inflation factors, I add a number of control variables to rule out the effects caused by certain 
deal characteristics. Then, I find targets hiring acquirers’ “kanji” securities houses as M&A advisors to 
be associated with lower acquirer CAR. Although this result is only moderately significant at the 10% 
level, it provides evidence for the presence of conflicts of interest for Japanese “kanji” securities houses 
advising M&A. One possible example for such conflicts of interest is that acquirers’ “kanji” securities 
houses knowing deeply the acquirers’ desires and weaknesses can help targets negotiate, set high target 
valuations, and earn more fees. However, I fail to find similar evidence of conflicts of interest for 
commercial banking groups. I also do not find evidence in support of a net certification effect. An 
acquirer’s decision regarding whether to hire its own “kanji” securities houses or commercial banks or 
not does not seem to affect its economic gain upon M&A announcement. Thus it seems “kanji” 
securities houses and commercial banks who have long-term relationships with acquirers and supposedly 
know some private information about them do not advise better deals. Last but not least, it is possible to 
improve my results regarding commercial bank advisors if there is more accurate data indicating 
banking relationships between acquirers and advisors. This is because the data I have only indicates 
banking relationships instead of commercial lending relationships where continuous monitoring is 
required, private information is more likely to be gathered, and conflicts of interest are more likely to 
emerge. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds in the following way: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
mergers and acquisitions. Section 3 talks about the data, its collection process, and my methodology. 
Section 4 presents my empirical results and concludes.  
Section 2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND THE QUESTION 
 My research is mainly related to two parts of the corporate finance literature. Firstly, it is related 
to the literature on whether mergers and acquisitions themselves create any value for shareholders or not. 
Secondly, there is the literature comparing the role of commercial banks with that of their investment 
banking counterparties in providing corporate finance advisory services. In this section, I discuss some 
papers relevant to my research question. 
2.1 Do Mergers and Acquisitions Create Value? 
 A great number of previous research has explored whether mergers and acquisitions create 
value or not. Based on 14 relevant informal studies and 100 relevant scientific studies conducted from 
1971 to 2001, Bruner (2002) concludes that in the aggregate, studies which utilized an event study 
framework find positive abnormal returns to targets, breakeven returns to buyers, and positive returns to 
the combination of both sides’ shareholders. In addition, based upon a recent set of Japanese data, 
Fatemi, Fooladi, and Garehkoolchian (2017) find that acquirers experience no significant gains while 
target reap significant benefits, which is consistent with the general results from the United States. In 
general, M&A deals, excluding bank mergers, tend to bring positive abnormal returns to target firms 
while causing acquirers to see zero or negative abnormal returns. This finding has been highly robust in 
the literature. 
There are many hypotheses trying to explain why shareholders receive M&A gains, especially 
those of target firms. Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), and 
Franks and Mayer (1996) investigate the corporate control hypothesis which stipulates that M&A gains 
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are due to the reduction in agency costs in the market for corporate control. According to the market 
power hypothesis which is studied by Beatty et al. (1987) and Berger and Humphrey (1992), M&A deals 
help enhance target’s competitive position and thus can bring its shareholders economic gains. In 
addition, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find synergy to be the primary motive in mergers and 
acquisitions which lead to positive combined gains. Last but not least, Hubbard and Palia (1999) find 
that target firms receive synergistic gains when conglomerates’ internal capital markets that “were 
expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets” are created. 
On the one hand, in order to be approved by its shareholders for an M&A deal, a target firm 
must receive some expectation of wealth gain. On the other hand, managers of an acquiring firm might 
carry out deals that provide zero expected gain to their shareholders. Amihud and Lev (1981), Amihud 
and Kamin (1979), and Lloyd, Hand and Modani (1987) discuss the managerial risk diversification 
hypothesis, which says that managers of acquiring firms carry out M&A deals so that they can lower 
their undiversifiable human capital investment in their firms. Amihud, Kamin, and Ronen (1983) and 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) are able to find evidence in favor of this hypothesis. The winner’s curse 
hypothesis or hubris hypothesis postulates that overly confident buyers pay too much for target firms. 
For instance, Roll (1986) finds that acquirers who overpay targets have a higher deal completion rate, 
which in turn leads to a decline in the gain to acquirers’ shareholders. However, in contrast to the US 
evidence, Schaik and Steenbeek (2004) find that Japanese bidders receive positive abnormal returns 
around deal announcement date. 
2.2 Commercial Banking Advisors Versus Investment Banking Advisors 
2.2.1 Certification Effect 
Similar to some previous studies including Puri (1994, 1996), Ang and Richardson (1994), 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997), Hebb(1999), and Allen, Jagtiani, 
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Peristiani, and Saunders (2004) , I refer to the ability of a commercial banking group or a securities 
house to transfer and reuse private information about a client in providing corporate finance services, 
which includes mergers and acquisitions, as the certification effect. However, instead of looking into 
these advisors’ ability in certifying target value, I choose to investigate their ability of utilizing their 
knowledge about acquirers to provide better-fitting M&A advisory services which should be taken 
positively by the stock market. It is not hard to imagine that a commercial bank who has been long 
enjoying a continuous relationship with its corporate clients would naturally possess some private 
information about them, since commercial lending requires commercial bankers to carry out ongoing 
monitoring of the lenders’ activities.  An investment bank or securities house also has access to clients’ 
private information when underwriting securities, but usually only during discrete and relatively short 
time period. By contrasting commercial banks with investment banks in this way, Allen et al. (2004) 
argue that “all else being equal, we would expect that the selection and use of a commercial bank advisor 
in an M&A transaction provides a higher certification effect than that provided by traditional investment 
banks.” This argument seems to have drawn a clear boundary between commercial banking and 
investment banking, but it was made in the United States and recent Japan is different from that. First, a 
Japanese “kanji” securities house who helped a client go public tend to offer other ongoing corporate 
services to the client as well, which could potentially let it accumulate private information about the 
client. Second, a financial group in Japan nowadays often has both a commercial bank and a securities 
house which often work closely with each other. For example, M&As advised by a Japanese securities 
house can often be financed by an affiliated commercial bank. Also, to carry out a Japanese commercial 
bank’s strategic plans made for its clients, its affiliated securities house can often be hired to work on the 
actual M&A products. After taking these characteristics of  the Japanese market into account, instead of 
studying commercial banks only, my research focus on the certification effects of both Japanese 
commercial banking groups and “kanji” securities houses. 
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2.2.2 Conflicts of Interest 
In theory, the certification effect is capable of enhancing the effectiveness of commercial banks 
and “kanji” securities houses acting as M&A advisors for their long-term clients. However, as is 
documented in Allen et al. (2004), there could be conflicts of interest which can bring negative impacts 
to such effectiveness. For example, target could be faced with financial troubles that are hidden deep and 
known only to its long-term commercial lender. In this case, the commercial bank would have an 
incentive to advise deals and let this target be bought by other companies, who would help solve its 
problems and pay its debts. In addition, a commercial banking group might want to advise clients on 
M&A deals only when they agree to borrow money from it. This “advising-and-lending” type of 
banking has become particularly popular in Japan, partly due to the Japanese low-interest-rate 
environment and partly due to the fact that the level of commercial lending is way below the level of 
deposits made by Japanese savers. Therefore, a commercial banking group could have an incentive to 
advise its clients to borrow money and buy targets that are not actually beneficial. Besides, Mehrotra, 
Schaik, Spronk, and Steenbeek (2011) point out that the Japanese market is one “where creditors play an 
important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance” and is much less shareholder focused than 
the U.S. market. Creditors’ strong presence in Japanese corporate governance could further deepen 
conflicts of interest between commercial banking groups and other stakeholders. In addition, Japanese 
“kanji” securities houses could also be faced with conflicts of interest. For instance, securities houses 
could advise clients on poor deals just to make quick fee income. Such problem could be worse in case 
of “kanji” houses since they could have private information about the clients and thus be better at selling 
poor deals to the clients. Such conflicts of interest could diminish the certification effects.  
2.2.3 Empirical Evidence 
Conflicting results have been found surrounding both conflicts of interest and the certification 
effect. Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Ang and Richardson (1994), and Puri (1996) find that in a before-
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Glass-Steagall setting, the debts underwritten by commercial banks were less likely to default compared 
with those by investment banks, indicating a net certification effect. However, stocks underwritten by 
commercial banking groups and those by investments banks in the 1920s did not show significant 
different performance. Puri (1994, 1996) finds evidence of a certification effect for commercial banks 
who reuse private information gained in commercial banking relationships to enhance their reputations. 
Post-Glass-Steagall findings on banks’ limited debt underwriting powers by Gande, Puri, Saunders, and 
Walter (1997)  and on equity underwriting powers by Hebb (1999) also tend to confirm a net 
certification effect for commercial banks. However, using a M&A advisory setting, Allen et al. (2004) 
find evidence supporting the certification effect only for deals where targets’ commercial banks act as 
their advisors. In contrast, for deals where acquirers’ commercial banks act as their advisors, conflicts of 
interests seem to dominate the certification effect. Last but not least, by studying 154 domestic mergers 
in Japan during 1977 to 1993, Kang, Shivdasani and Yamada (2000) find acquirer abnormal returns to 
be strongly positively related with the strength of acquirer's relationships with banks.  
2.3 The Question 
As is discussed above, previous studies regarding the certification effect and conflict of interests 
are mostly done in the United States and have produced interesting results. Japan is featured with a 
highly active M&A market, a very strong commercial banking presence, a special presence of “kanji” 
securities houses, and a potentially close tie between commercial banking and corporate advisory. 
What’s more, Japanese “main yose” phenomenon could make Japanese bank-affiliated advisors to be 
more careful about advising M&A, especially for acquirers. Therefore after learning the U.S. results, it is 
natural to ask “What about Japan?”  Based upon a set of Japanese data, I extend the literature by 
examining whether a net certification effect exists for Japanese commercial banks and “kanji” securities 
houses, or whether conflicts of interests dominate such certification effect. 
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Section 3. THE DATA AND THE METHODOLOGY 
My analysis utilizes a data set that consists of 600 observations. Descriptive statistics can be 
found in Table 2 and Table 3. Merger and acquisition information was originally downloaded from the 
RECOF DATA Corporation database and the Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional database. As 
the first step, 1,395 completed M&A deals carried out by Japanese public firms or their subsidiaries with 
a deal value of larger than 500 million JPY during the time period from January 1, 2012 through 
December 31, 2017 were identified. This period was selected for two reasons. First, this was the most 
recent period and the most of relevant data could be easily found. Many details, including who the 
advisors were, of M&A deals before this period could hardly be retrieved from Datastream Professional. 
Second, this period begins three years after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and should have 
been relieved of the crisis’s impact. The criteria of deals with a value larger than 500 million JPY was 
added due to the fact that smaller deals, which amounted to more than 10,000 and were expected to have 
relatively small economic impact, would make my data collection and analysis too complicated. For 
each deal, information about financial advisors and some other details not included in the RECOF 
database was collected manually from the Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional database.  
I then took steps and excluded 795 deals which could not be used in my analysis. Firstly, I 
excluded 338 deals where no advisors were disclosed and 161 deals with either incomplete or conflicting 
information. Secondly, 62 deals involving financial firms as either target or acquirer were also excluded. 
Thirdly, to ensure that deals in my sample resulted in a transfer of control, I further excluded 56 deals 
where acquirers’ ownership in target firms failed to raise above 50% after the deals. Then, 160 deals 
which had overlapping 250-trading-day event windows were also excluded for robustness purposes. To 
do this, I marked deals whenever there was an overlap in both acquirer ticker and event window (250 
trading days, or 365 natural days) , kept the ones that happened first and excluded the other overlapping 
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ones. Last but not least, I excluded 18 observations with toehold larger than 50% since they did not lead 
to a transfer of corporate control. 
3.1 Estimating Abnormal Returns for Acquiring Firms 
 When it comes to examining the effects brought by mergers and acquisitions, an event study 
framework is widely used by the academia. I also apply this method and compute cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) to acquirers for a three-day window around the deal announcement day and use it as the 
dependent variable in my models. Unlike many previous researchers, I do not investigate abnormal 
returns to target firms simply because the majority of targets in my sample are private firms. This three-
day window consists of the deal announcement date itself, along with one day before and one day after it. 
In some cases the advisors are disclosed at the deal announcement, in other cases they are not. However, 
whether the advisors’ names appear at the deal announcement or not, an soundly designed and 
attractively priced M&A deal that can enhance the fundamental value of an acquirer should be rewarded 
by the stock market. In other words, a good deal should produce positive impact on the stock price of an 
acquirer.  
The same standardized procedures used in previous event studies including Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen, and Roll (1969), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Stulz, Walking and Song (1990), and Allen, 
Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2004), were also followed by me in estimating acquirer abnormal 
returns. Firstly, I constructed a market model for acquirers using daily returns of a 190-trading-day 
period that begins 250 days before and ends 60 days before the announcement date of the M&A deal. 
This step yields 3-day expected returns. Then, by subtracting 3-day actual returns with the expected 
returns, I obtained an estimation of 3-day abnormal returns for all acquirers in all deals. In all the deals 
included within my sample, acquirer is a public firm listed on TSE First Section, TSE Second Section, 
JASDAQ, Mothers, or some other smaller Japanese stock exchanges. In order to estimate abnormal 
returns, daily closing price after adjusting for stock split and stock dividends for each acquirer over the 
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period January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2017 was downloaded from the Nikkei NEEDS database. 
For certain acquirers who had missing price for a day or two, I filled them with the prices one day before. 
Daily returns, beta, and normal returns were then calculated for all acquirers. The M&A announcement 
dates downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional database were often the dates 
using the local time of the United States. To accurately measure the reaction from Japanese market, I 
manually verified each announcement date according to each acquirer’s official news release and filings, 
and used this date whenever there was a discrepancy. 
3.2 Identifying Relationship 
Previous studies, such as Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2004), have focused solely 
on commercial banking relationships between firms and their advisors. Instead, based on the 
characteristics of the Japanese corporate finance advisory market, I consider both commercial banking 
relationships and “kanji” securities underwriting relationships. Some previous studies have succeeded in 
identifying the prior commercial banking relationships between firms and their advisors using a 
Lexis/Nexis search. This approach would be ideal for U.S. deals. However, in Japan, with limited access 
to accurate information on prior relationship before M&A deals, I choose to identify a general 
commercial banking relationship which can be found both on company websites and in the Nikkei 
ValueSearch database. In addition, a Japanese public firm also usually disclose its so-called “kanji” 
(arranger) securities houses who have historically helped underwrite its IPO and potentially provide a 
line of other services, including market making, research coverage, M&A coverage and advisory. 
Although these “kanji” securities houses do not monitor their clients like commercial banks, they could 
potentially enjoy a certain level of information advantage when providing M&A services for their clients, 
compared with many other advisors. 
I searched for each acquirer’s commercial banks and IPO securities underwriters (so-called 
“kanji” securities houses) using the Nikkei ValueSearch database. Then, I referred to this information to 
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determine whether there were prior relationships between acquirers and the financial advisors on both 
sides. In this process, involvement of securities houses affiliated with commercial banks (e.g., 
Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities, SMBC Nikko Securities, and Mizuho Securities) was not 
only recorded as underwriters, but also as indicating commercial banking relationships with group banks 
(i.e., MUFG Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and Mizuho Bank). Four dummy variables 
were then constructed to identify the prior relationship: A_Aad_S  takes on the value 1 if acquirer’s 
advisor or its affiliated entities helped underwrite IPO securities for acquirer; A_Aad_B takes on the 
value 1 if acquirer’s advisor or its affiliated entities had commercial banking relationship with acquirer; 
A_Tad_S takes on the value 1 if target’s advisor or its affiliated entities helped underwrite IPO securities 
for acquirer; A_Tad_B takes on the value 1 if target’s advisor or its affiliated entities had commercial 
banking relationship with acquirer. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
After taking the steps described above, I reach at a sample which includes 600 deals. Key 
descriptive statistics regarding acquirers’ relationships with financial advisors are displayed in the first 
part of Table 2. The mean of cumulative abnormal return is significantly different from zero at 0.95%. 
Therefore, unlike many U.S. observations and consistent with the Japanese results by Kang, Shivdasani, 
and Yamada (2000) and Schaik and Steenbeek (2004), it seems that the acquirers in Japan are able to 
capture positive gains by carrying out M&A deals. Using a mean-plus-minus-three-sigma criteria, I am 
able to identify fourteen deals that can be considered outliers. I then check whether these deals should 
indeed be considered outliers and find that most of these outlier observations have their economic roots. 
For instance, the highest acquirer CAR in my sample is 38.84%, which seems unnaturally high. However, 
this deal is a within-industry consolidation between Kobe Diesel Co. and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
Marine Machinery & Equipment Co. Ltd, and a highly positive reaction from the stock market is not 
strange. Therefore, outliers like this are not excluded from my analysis to reflect economic reality. 
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35.0% of the acquirers hired financial advisors who also had functioned as their “kanji” 
securities houses and experienced an average CAR of 0.89%, while the rest saw an average CAR of 
0.98%. 25.5% of the acquirers hired financial advisors with whom they had commercial banking 
relationships and saw an average CAR of 1.21%, seemingly larger than the rest who experienced an 
average CAR of 0.86%. In addition, 16.0% of the acquirers faced target advisors who had functioned as 
acquirers’ own “kanji” securities houses and saw an average CAR of only 0.11%, seemingly much 
smaller than the rest who experienced an average CAR of 1.11%. Last but not least, 18.5% of the 
acquirers faced target advisors with whom acquirers had commercial banking relationships and 
experienced an average CAR of 0.73%, smaller than the rest who saw an average CAR of 1.00%. In 
addition to sample means, I also calculated and tested the difference between the ones with relationships 
and those without. To properly test the difference, I first conducted an F-test for each subsample pair to 
check whether variances are equal or not, then I conducted a T-test respectively. Although I failed to 
find statistically significant differences between these four pairs, the differences for certain pairs 
themselves still seem to be economically large. For example, deals advised by advisors who had 
commercial banking relationships with the acquirers brought on average 0.35% higher abnormal returns 
than the rest, which is a 40.7% difference. This seems to suggest that commercial banking groups can 
provide better M&A advisory services for clients with whom they had banking relationships and can be 
consistent with a certification effect and the “main yose” phenomenon. Further, deals where the targets’ 
advisors had functioned as the acquirers’ “kanji” arrangers brought an average CAR of only 0.11%, 
which is not significantly different from zero, while the rest experienced on average 1.11%, which is 
significant at 1% level. This 1.00% difference seems to indicate that acquirers’ “kanji” securities houses 
can harm acquirers when advising target firms and supports the existence of conflicts of interest.  
3.4 Adding Control Variables 
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The differences in cumulative abnormal returns could be caused by the certification effect 
and/or the conflicts of interest which are discussed in Section 2.2. However, there could also be a 
number of other explanations, such as the differences in relative size between buyer and target and the 
method of payment. Therefore, in addition to abnormal returns and dummy variables indicating the 
relationship between acquirers and financial advisors, I incorporate a set of control variables into my 
analysis to capture the impact resulting from deal characteristics. Many of these control variables are 
popular among the corporate finance research community. The rationale behind these control variables 
and how I construct them are discussed in the following subsections. A brief definition of all control 
variables is available in Table 1, while descriptive statistics for dummy control variables can be found in 
Table 2 and Table 3.  
3.4.1 Relative Size between Acquirer and Target 
Relative size between acquirer and target is an important factor to consider in M&A and is often 
included as a control variable in relevant studies. It is intuitive to think that relative size affects the 
magnitude of acquirer abnormal returns. For example, if a target is very small compared with its acquirer, 
the impact of their merger should be rather limited since acquirer does not pay much. However, there are 
different ideas and results when it comes to whether this impact itself is negative or positive. Moeller, 
Schlingermann, and Stulz (2004) find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related with 
relative deal size: small acquirers receive roughly 2% higher abnormal returns in their sample. In 
addition, using a set of Japanese data, Hanamura, Inoue, and Suzuki (2008) also find buyer’s abnormal 
returns to be higher for deals where target’s market capitalization is larger relative to buyer’s market 
capitalization. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that “the returns to acquirers are more positive 
the greater the relative size of the target for private targets and subsidiaries and more negative the greater 
the relative size of the target for public targets.” Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, and Saunders (2004) expect a 
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negative relationship between relative size and abnormal returns because merger with a large target 
could escalate the internal fight over capital allocation. 
To control for the potential effects discussed in the paragraph above, I constructed a 
RELA_SIZE (relative size) variable using the following three steps. First, I collected deal values from 
two sources: the RECOF database and the Datastream Professional database. The RECOF data uses JPY 
as the unit for deal values and is preferred in my analysis. However, when the RECOF database failed to 
provide a deal value, I used the deal values downloaded from Datastream Professional and translated 
them from U.S. dollar to Japanese yen. Downloaded from investing.com, the exchange rates for this 
purpose are the monthly exchange rates at the time of deal announcements. Second, daily market 
capitalization data for all acquirers was downloaded from the Nikkei NEEDS database using closing 
price. Finally, I calculated RELA_SIZE by dividing deal values with market capitalization of acquirers. 
Although there are conflicting ideas and results regarding the sign condition of RELA_SIZE, I choose to 
follow the Japanese results found by Hanamura, Inoue, and Suzuki (2008) and estimate a positive 
coefficient for this variable. 
3.4.2 Payment Method 
 Variables indicating whether cash medium or stock medium are used have been widely 
incorporated into M&A gains models. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1990), Huang and Walking (1987), 
Travlos (1987), and Yook (2000) find significant negative abnormal returns at deal announcement for 
deals financed with stock. A widely accepted explanation for this result is the adverse selection effect. 
Acquirers tend to make stock offers when they, with private information about their own value, know 
that their shares are overvalued by target shareholders. Target shareholders would then put a discount on 
their estimate of an acquirer’s value since they recognize and understand this adverse selection effect. In 
addition, Hanamura, Inoue, and Suzuki (2008) find that in Japan, targets’ abnormal returns tend to be 
higher when cash is chosen as the method of payment. To indicate whether a deal is an all-cash deal, a 
18 
 
non-cash deal, or a combination of cash and non-cash, I constructed three variables: PCT_CASH 
(percentage of cash used in deal payment), TENDER_OFFER (1 if deal is done using a tender offer, 0 
otherwise), STOCK_SWAP (1 if deal is done using a stock swap, 0 otherwise) from Datastream 
Professional for each deal. It is suggested by previous researchers that PCT_CASH and 
TENDER_OFFER should have a positive coefficient and STOCK_SWAP a negative one. 
3.4.3 Toehold Investments and Final Holdings 
Toehold is defined as an acquirer’s ex-ante shareholdings in a target prior to a deal 
announcement. Researchers have considered toehold investments to be an important issue in M&A deals 
since they are capable of reducing potential free-riding problems and resistance from target management. 
Stulz et al (1990) and Betton and Eckbo (2000) find that the gains to target shareholders are negatively 
related to acquirer’s toehold investments.   Mantecon (2009) also finds toehold investments to be 
associated with larger gains to acquirers in deals where both sides are in the same country. In the spirit 
of these scholars, I constructed TOEHOLD with ex-ante shareholding data downloaded from Datastream 
Professional. In addition, I utilized the same database and added a FINAL_HLD variable to indicate the 
eventual percentage of shares held by acquirers. The intuition of adding this variable is to rule out the 
potential effects caused by minority shareholders after M&A. Following previous studies, I estimate a 
positive coefficient for TOEHOLD. 
3.4.4 Diversification or Not 
There are three types of M&A deals when one thinks about the industries which acquiring and 
target firms are in. First, the target can be in the same industry as the acquirer, which is usually called a 
horizontal M&A. Such deals are often expected to bring economy of scale and cost reduction. Second, 
the target can be in the value chain of the acquirer, which constitutes a vertical M&A and, in theory, 
allows the acquirer to reap more value. Third, a deal can be neither horizontal nor vertical and is called a 
19 
 
conglomerate or diversifying deal. Berger and Ofek (1995) find that during 1986 to 1991 and on average, 
conglomerate firms suffer from a 13% to 15% value loss due to diversification programs and conclude 
such loss are caused by overinvestment and cross-subsidization and modestly reduced by tax benefits of 
diversification. They also find value loss to be “smaller when the segments of the diversified firm are in 
the same two-digit SIC code”. In addition, Comment and Jarrell (1995) find evidence of a negative 
relation between abnormal returns and several metrics measuring firm diversification. Lang and Stulz 
(1994) also document a negative relation between Tobin’s q-ratio and these diversification measures. In 
order to control for the effects brought by such variations in targets’ and acquirers’ industries, I used the 
industry specification data provided by Datastream Professional and constructed a dummy variable 
called CROSSIND (1 if acquirer and target are in different industries and 0 otherwise). I estimate a 
negative sign condition for this variable following these previous results.  
3.4.5 International Deals 
There are different opinions regarding the effects of M&A deals that cross country borders and 
corporate multinationalism. Doukas and Travlos (1988) find that shareholders of multinational 
corporations without operations in the country where target resides see significant positive abnormal 
returns when international acquisitions are announced. What they find is consistent with the theory of 
corporate multinationalism which predicts that expanding existing international network helps enhance a 
firm’s market value. In addition, Freund et al. (2007), Francis et al. (2008), and Akhigbe and Martin 
(2000)  report positive abnormal returns for acquirers in cross-border deals. What’s more, Kang (1993) 
finds statistically significant wealth gains to both Japanese acquirers and U.S. target firms for Japanese 
M&A deals happening in the U.S. However, many also have found conflicting evidence. For example, 
based on a set of 44,288 observations of U.S. firms between 1984 and 1997, Denis et al. (2002) find 
global diversification to be associated with reduced firm value. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) report 
a lower acquirer gains for cross-border deals compared to domestic ones using 4430 observations by U.S. 
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acquirers from 1985 to 1995. Similar results are also found by Chatterjee and Aw (2004), Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2000) and Mantecon (2009). In order to control for the effect brought by cross-border deals, I 
add a dummy variable CROSS_BORDER (1 if target’s headquarter is located outside Japan and 0 
otherwise ) to my analysis. Following the Japanese-U.S. evidence by Kang (1993), I estimate a positive 
sign condition for this variable. 
3.4.6 Reputation of Advisors in M&A deals 
Another important factor considered by the academia when examining the role of advisors in 
M&A deals is reputation. The papers on reputation give mixed results. On the one hand, some papers 
show that advisors with good reputation have failed to capture gains for the bidders. The results by 
Bowers and Miller (1990) indicate that acquisition deals where first-tier investment banks are hired, 
either by the buyers or targets , bring a larger total incremental wealth gains. Unfortunately, first-tier 
investment bankers are not found able to produce higher gains for the shareholders of acquirers in their 
analysis. To measure reputation, some other scholars tried using market share as a proxy. For example, 
Ismail (2010) defines the ten advisors with the ten largest M&A market share as tier-one. He reports that 
“acquirers advised by tier-one advisors lost more than $42 billion, while those advised by tier-two 
advisors gained $13.5 billion at the merger announcement.” Still, in his paper, total gains to the 
combination of both sides are found to have a positive relationship with high reputation but mostly 
driven by targets’ positive returns. Chuang (2014) also reports that hiring tier-one advisors caused 
bidders to see larger losses but did not impact shareholder wealth for target firms significantly. In 
addition, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) show that synergistic gains captured by the bidders became lower 
when top-tier advisors were hired, although top-tier advisors tended to complete deals both faster and at 
a higher success rate. On the other hand, some other papers show that employing advisors with good 
reputation can lift acquirer gain. For example, Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) specify another 
eight investment banks as top-tier and considered the rest non-top-tier using market share. Contrary to 
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prior studies, they find top-tier advisors capable of bringing better returns to acquirers than non-top-tier 
advisors, which on average led to a $65.83 million dollar gain for acquirer shareholders. However, this 
only held for public acquisitions “where the advisor reputational exposure and required skills set are 
relatively larger.” In addition, Rau (2000) find that acquirers advised by first-tier advisors saw greater 
abnormal returns than those who hired non-first-tier advisors in tender offers, but not in mergers. Last 
but not least, Kale et al. (2003) document that the total absolute gains, along with the percentage of it 
captured by the bidder exhibit a positive relationship with the reputational gap between the bidder’s 
advisor and that of target.  
Therefore, to control for these effects associated with advisor reputation, I constructed three 
variables: A_TIER_ONE which indicates whether acquirer’s advisors include at least a tier-one advisor 
(1 if yes, 0 if not), T_TIER_ONE which indicates whether target’s advisors include at least a tier-one 
advisor (1 if yes, 0 if not), and TIER_ONE which indicates whether at least one tier-one advisor is 
involved (1 if yes, 0 if not). In order to construct these three dummy variables, I collected M&A rank 
value data for the period 2012 through 2017 from Japanese M&A Review Financial Advisor published 
by Thomson Reuters. I then marked the top ten advisors or financial groups, as in terms of total deal 
value market share in Japanese M&A market over these six years, as the tier-one advisors, while all 
others were considered tier-two. The resulting top ten tier-one advisors in my analysis are Mitsubishi 
UFJ Morgan Stanley, Mizuho Financial Group, Nomura, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Sumitomo 
Mitsui Financial Group, J.P. Morgan, Citi, Daiwa, and Deutsche. 
3.4.7 Deal Attitude 
Deal attitude (friendly, neutral, or hostile) of each deal can be found in the Datastream 
Professional database. Out of my 600 Japanese observations, I find zero hostile deals and only five deals 
that were considered neutral, while the rest 595 deals are all friendly. This is no surprise since hostile 
takeover is a very rare practice for Japanese managers. However, deal attitude is an important variable 
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often included in studies done in other countries and has influences on deal outcomes. For example, 
Cotter and Zenner (1994) report lower abnormal returns for hostile takeovers compared to friendly deals 
after controlling for a number of deal characteristics. Schwert (2000) also finds acquirers to be faced 
with lower abnormal returns in hostile takeovers. Therefore, although there are only five neutral deals in 
my sample, I add a FRIENDLY (1 if friendly and 0 if otherwise) variable anyway in my analysis for 
robustness purposes and estimate a positive sign condition for it. 
3.4.8 Other Control Variables 
In addition to the variables discussed above, I add RUMORED  and annual dummy variables to 
my analysis. The Datastream Professional database marks deals that had rumors before actual 
announcements as using a “rumored deal technique”. I used this information to construct RUMORED (1 
if a deal had been rumored to be going to happen before actual announcement and 0 otherwise) and put it 
in my models since ex-ante rumors and information leakage could distort market reaction. Annual 
dummy variables were constructed using the year of deal announcement date are intended to capture 
time-related effects that are not already in my analysis. It would be ideal to also have financial data of 
target firms as control variables, such as financial leverage and profit margin. However, a large number 
of the targets in my sample were private firms and very limited financial information could be found 
about them. 
Since I apply twenty-two independent variables (including annual dummy variables) in my 
analysis, it is natural for one to worry about a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, I first evaluated 
whether multicollinearity is an issue or not using a correlation matrix for all independent variables. The 
correlation matrix is displayed in Table 4. Most of the independent variables exhibit low correlations 
that are smaller than 0.2 with each other, while certain high correlation coefficients can be expected due 
to the variables’ definitions. Nevertheless, I further check variance inflation factors (VIFs) and confirm 
that this does not constitute a multicollinearity problem. 
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3.5 The Models 
 After my set of control variables are constructed, I estimate the following three expressions 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for my entire data set of 600 observations: 
Model (1): 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴_𝐴𝑎𝑑_𝐵, 𝐴_𝑇𝑎𝑑_𝐵, 𝐴_𝐴𝑎𝑑_𝑆, 𝐴_𝑇𝑎𝑑_𝑆) +  𝜀𝑖 
Model (2): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴_𝐴𝑎𝑑_𝐵, 𝐴_𝑇𝑎𝑑_𝐵, 𝐴_𝐴𝑎𝑑_𝑆, 𝐴_𝑇𝑎𝑑_𝑆, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝑃𝐶𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻, 𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐿𝑌, 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐷, 
𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑅, 𝑅𝑈𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐷, 𝑇𝑂𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿_𝐻𝐿𝐷, 𝐴_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅_𝑂𝑁𝐸, 𝑇_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅_𝑂𝑁𝐸, 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅_𝑂𝑁𝐸) + 𝜀𝑖 
Model (3): 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴_𝐴𝑎𝑑_𝐵, 𝐴_𝑇𝑎𝑑_𝐵, 𝐴_𝐴𝑎𝑑_𝑆, 𝐴_𝑇𝑎𝑑_𝑆, 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸, 𝑃𝐶𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻, 𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐿𝑌, 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐷, 
                𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑅, 𝑅𝑈𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐷, 𝑇𝑂𝐸𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷, 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐿_𝐻𝐿𝐷, 𝐴_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅_𝑂𝑁𝐸, 𝑇_𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅_𝑂𝑁𝐸, 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅_𝑂𝑁𝐸, 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅) +  𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer i, and a definition for all other variables 
can be found in Table 1. 𝜀𝑖 represents the error term. 
Section 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
In this section, three items are discussed. First, overall deal characteristics (presented in Table 3) 
controlling for commercial banking and “kanji” house relationships are reported. Descriptive statistics 
controlling for the dummy control variables have already been discussed in Section 3.3 and are available 
in Table 2 and Table 3. Then, OLS results (presented in Table 5) for all three model specifications are 
reported in detail. Finally, I draw conclusions based on the regression results.  
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Table 3 shows the deal characteristics controlling for commercial banking and “kanji” house 
relationships. A_Aad_S, A_Tad_S, and A_Tad_B taking on the value of 1 seem to be related with lower 
probabilities of international deals, one potential explanation for which could be that Japanese domestic 
securities houses tend to have weaker global presence compared with foreign advisors and are more 
likely to be involved in cross-border deals. In addition, having any of the four acquirer-advisor 
relationships seems to be associated with higher probabilities of tender offers. Besides, acquirers in deals 
where their “kanji” houses are employed as advisors seem to have more toehold investments than those 
in other deals. What’ more, A_Aad_S seems to be positively related with rumors before announcements. 
A_Tad_S seems to be positively associated with fewer cash payments and higher probabilities of stock 
swaps. A_Tad_B also seems to be negatively related with acquirers’ shares in targets and positively with 
cross-industry deals. Finally, the association observed between these four main variables and the three 
reputation variables are expected because three megabanks and five major Japanese securities houses are 
all considered tier-one in my analysis. 
Model (1) includes only my four main variables indicating commercial banking/securities 
underwriting relationship between acquirers and advisors: A_Aad_B, A_Tad_B, A_Aad_S, and A_Tad_S. 
Unfortunately, the coefficients on these variables are no significantly different from zero. The intercept 
is positive at 1.0% and significant at the 1% level. Adjusted R squared is also low at only -0.19%, 
indicating a poor explanatory power for Model (1). After adding thirteen variables intended to control 
for deal characteristics and advisor reputations to Model (1), I reach at Model (2). In this model, I still 
fail to find significant results for three of my main variables: A_Aad_B, A_Tad_B, and A_Aad_S. 
However, A_Tad_S shows a negative impact on acquirer CAR with a coefficient of -1.4% and is 
significant at 10%. It seems that Japanese acquirers, see abnormal returns from M&A deals that are on 
average 1.4 percent lower if their “kanji” securities houses advise target firms. The overall explanatory 
power, measured in adjusted R squared, increases from -0.19% to 3.80% due to the control variables 
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newly included. Of these thirteen added control variables, four are found to have significant influence on 
acquirer CAR. RELA_SIZE is strongly significant at 1% and is positively related with acquirer CAR. The 
coefficient of CROSSBORDER is -1.3% and significant at 5%, indicating that international targets bring 
gains that are on average 1.3 percent lower to acquirer shareholders. The coefficient of PCT_CASH is -
0.034 and that of STOCK_SWAP is -3.7%, both significant at the 10% level. I fail to find coefficients 
that are significantly different from zero for other control variables in Model (2). The intercept of 1.8% 
is not significantly different from zero. Model (3) further incorporates annual dummy variables in 
addition to the variables used in Model (2). Adjusted R squared does improve slightly from 3.80% to 
3.87%, but the main results do not vary much from those of Model (2). The low explanatory power here 
could mean that I have missed some important control variables. The coefficients of year 2012, 2013, 
2014, 2015, and 2016 are all negative, but only Y2013 and Y2016 seem to have effects on acquirer CAR 
that are significantly different from zero. 
 This paper examines the role of commercial banking groups and “kanji” securities houses as 
M&A advisors in Japan using a sample of 600 deals announced during the time period from January 1, 
2012 through December 31, 2017.  In contrast to many U.S. results and consistent with the Japanese 
results by Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000) and Schaik and Steenbeek (2004), I find significantly 
positive average abnormal returns of 0.95% to acquirers upon M&A announcements. My analysis shows 
that wealth gains, measured as 3-day cumulative abnormal returns, to Japanese public acquirers tend to 
be smaller when targets’ financial advisors are acquirers’ “kanji” securities houses who once helped 
acquirers go public. This result is significant only at the 10% level. However, commercial banking 
relationship between acquirers and advisors does not seem to influence acquirer gains. In addition, 
acquirer CAR tends to be higher when target is larger relative to acquirer. Cross-border deals where 
targets are located outside Japan tend to bring negative impact on acquirer gains. 
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 My results provide evidence in favor of net conflicts of interest with regard to Japanese “kanji” 
securities houses. A Japanese acquirer’s “kanji” securities house once helped its IPO and likely continue 
to provide a series of services, ranging from market making to corporate advisory, to it. In such a 
relationship, it is possible that the securities house has cumulated some private information about the 
acquirer. As the target’s advisor, the securities house has incentives to help sell the target and earn fees, 
without having to be worry about possible bad outcomes for the acquirer. Therefore, Japanese “kanji” 
securities houses could potentially utilize their private knowledge about acquirers in M&A negotiations 
and set higher valuation for targets in order to earn higher fees. Such conflicts of interest can therefore 
be priced by the market in the form of significantly lower returns to acquirers when targets hire acquirers’ 
“kanji” as financial advisors.  
Unfortunately, I am not able to find similar evidence for deals where targets advisors are 
acquirers’ commercial banks. Contrary to the results by Kang, Shivdasani and Yamada (2000) where 
close banking relationships enhanced shareholder wealth, my analysis also seems to produce little 
evidence for a net certification effect for either commercial banks or securities houses when they 
function as acquirers’ advisors. However, this, to a degree, could be caused by the imperfectness of 
dummy variables indicating the commercial banking in my analysis. The data I collect from Nikkei 
ValueSearch show the commercial banks with whom each acquirer had a relationship with, but this 
relationship is not necessarily a commercial lending one. For instance, Toyota Motor Corp., Japan’s top 
automobile maker who is also famous for not borrowing money, has banking relationships with MUFG 
bank and SMBC according to Nikkei ValueSearch. This relationship can hardly be a lending one since 
Toyota has a strong reserve of cash and does not borrow, therefore the two banking groups do not 
monitor Toyota’s financials and should not have much private information about Toyota. Nevertheless, 
Nikkei ValueSearch is the only source available to me, which could lead to biased data and the 
27 
 
insignificant results that I find. Further studies could ideally avoid this problem by having commercial 
banking relationships data of higher accuracy. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Definition of Variables 
A_Aad_S acquirer’s advisor or its affiliated entities underwrote securities for acquirer. 
A_Aad_B acquirer’s advisor or its affiliated entities had commercial banking relationship with acquirer. 
A_Tad_S target’s advisor or its affiliated entities underwrote securities for acquirer. 
A_Tad_B target’s advisor or its affiliated entities had commercial banking relationship with acquirer. 
RELA_SIZE Relative size calculated as deal value divided by market capitalization of acquirer. 
PCT_CASH Percentage of cash used in deal payment. 
TENDER_OFFER A dummy indicating whether a deal is done using a tender offer, 1 if yes and 0 if otherwise 
STOCK_SWAP A dummy indicating whether a deal is done using a stock swap, 1 if yes and 0 if otherwise 
FRIENDLY A dummy indicating whether a deal is a friendly one or a neutral one, 1 if friendly and 0 if 
neutral. 
CROSSIND A dummy indicating whether a deal is cross-industry or not, 1 if cross-industry and 0 
otherwise. 
CROSSBORDER A dummy indicating whether a deal crosses international border or not, 1 if target’s 
headquarter is located outside Japan and 0 otherwise. 
RUMORED A dummy indicating whether a deal is “rumored”, 1 if the deal had been rumored to be going 
to happen before actual announcement and 0 otherwise 
TOEHOLD An acquirer’s ex-ante percentage of share in a target prior to a deal announcement. 
FINAL_HLD An acquirer’s final percentage of share in a target after a deal is done. 
A_TIER_ONE A dummy indicating whether acquirer’s advisors include at least a tier-one advisor, 1 if yes and 
0 if not 
T_TIER_ONE A dummy indicating whether target’s advisors include at least a tier-one advisor, 1 if yes and 0 
if not 
TIER_ONE A dummy indicating whether at least a tier-one advisor is involved, 1 if yes and 0 if not 
Y201X Dummy variables indicating when the deal announcement date was for year 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017 
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Table 5. OLS Results 
Variable Definition Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept OLS constant 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.065* 
(0.038) 
A_Aad_B Acquirer hires its own commercial bank 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
A_Tad_B Target hires acquirer's commercial bank 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
A_Aad_S Acquirer hires its "kanji" securities house 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.0003 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
A_Tad_S Target hires acquirer's "kanji" securities house 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
RELA_SIZE Deal value over acquirer market cap 
 
0.046*** 
(0.010) 
0.046*** 
(0.010) 
PCT_CASH Percentage of cash payment 
 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
TENDER_OFFER Deal is done with a tender offer 
 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
STOCK_SWAP Deal is done with a stock swap 
 
-0.037* 
(0.019) 
-0.039** 
(0.019) 
FRIENDLY Friendly deal attitude 
 
0.023 
(0.027) 
0.022 
(0.027) 
CROSSIND Acquirer and target in different industries 
 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
CROSSBORDER Target HQ outside Japan 
 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
RUMORED Rumor about deal before announcement 
 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
TOEHOLD Acquirer's ex-ante share in target 
 
-0.011 
(0.027) 
-0.017 
(0.027) 
FINAL_HLD Acquirer's final share in target 
 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
A_TIER_ONE Acquirer hires at least a tier-one advisor 
 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.0002 
(0.011) 
T_TIER_ONE Target hires at least a tier-one advisor 
 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
TIER_ONE At least a tier-one advisor acts as advisor 
 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
Y2012 Dummy for 2012 
  
-0.016 
(-0.010) 
Y2013 Dummy for 2013 
  
-0.022** 
(-0.010) 
Y2014 Dummy for 2014 
  
-0.015 
(-0.010) 
Y2015 Dummy for 2015 
  
-0.012 
(-0.010) 
Y2016 Dummy for 2016 
  
0.019* 
(-0.010) 
R Squared   0.50% 6.50% 7.40% 
Adjusted R2  -0.19% 3.80% 3.87% 
Observations   600 600 600 
Notes: *, **, *** are significance indicators at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
